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All the Single Ladies: Job Promotions and the Durability 
of Marriage†
By Olle Folke and Johanna Rickne*
We study how promotions to top jobs affect the probability of divorce. 
We compare the relationship trajectories of winning and losing 
 candidates for mayor and parliamentarian and find that a promotion 
to one of these jobs doubles the baseline probability of divorce for 
women, but not for men. We also find a widening gender gap in divorce 
rates for men and women after being promoted to CEO. An analy-
sis of possible mechanisms shows that divorces are  concentrated in 
more gender-traditional couples, while women in more gender-equal 
couples are unaffected. (JEL J12, J16, M12, M51)
Around the world, women are severely underrepresented at the top of  organizational hierarchies. In 2017, men accounted for 94 percent of CEOs 
in Forbes 500 firms and more than 77 percent of the world’s parliamentarians (www.
fortune.org, www.ipu.org). This inequality translates into gender gaps in income, 
status, voice, and democratic representation (e.g., Albrecht, BjÖrklund, and Vroman 
2003 and Arulampalam, Booth, and Bryan 2007). It also feeds negative stereotypes 
about women’s leadership abilities and depresses the career ambitions of young 
women (Beaman et al. 2009, 2012).
This paper contributes to understanding women’s absence from top jobs by 
 investigating the effect of job promotions on divorce. We add to previous work 
about the friction between marital stability and women’s career success. Research 
has shown that increases in women’s—but not men’s—earnings are correlated 
with divorce (Becker, Landes, and Michael 1977; Weiss and Willis 1997). Higher 
 levels of divorce and marital problems have also been found in couples where the 
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wife earns more than the husband (Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan 2015). Speed 
 dating experiments have shown that men shy away from women they perceive 
to be smarter or more ambitious than themselves (Fisman et al. 2006). Evidence 
that the career-relationship trade-off is noticeable for women further down on the 
career ladder comes from recent field experiments on MBA students. When told 
that their self-reported ambitions would be shared with fellow students, single 
women  drastically understated their ambition levels compared to women already 
in  relationships (Bursztyn, Fujiwara, and Pallais 2017).
We contribute the first causal evidence on how promotions impact marriage 
 durability across genders. We document that being promoted to a top job leads to 
a large increase in the probability of divorce among women, but not among men. 
This causal claim is based on 30  years of detailed Swedish register data and a 
 differences-in-differences (DID) design that follows job candidates before and after 
promotions. Most of the analysis focuses on the jobs of mayor and parliamentarian, 
two jobs at the pinnacle of power in the public sector.1 We can identify and fol-
low both winning and losing candidates for these positions over time, before and 
after their promotion. This lets us document the absence of pre-trends in divorce 
and other observables between promoted and non-promoted candidates (see, e.g., 
Greene and Quester 1982 and Johnson and Skinner 1986).
The results show that a promotion doubles the divorce rate among promoted women 
compared to those who tried, but failed, to get the promotion. After three years on 
the new job, 7 percentage points fewer of the female mayors and  parliamentarians 
remained married to their spouse compared to women who ran for office but lost. 
This result is corroborated in a subsample of closely contested elections, a situation 
in which the promotion is quasi-randomly assigned between job rivals.
Extending the analysis to the private sector, we study all CEO promotions in 
Swedish private firms over a 12-year period. Comparing men and women promoted 
to the CEO level, we document a strikingly similar pattern of a widening gender 
gap in divorce rates after promotion.
To analyze the potential mechanism(s) behind the divorce effect for women, 
we  split the sample of political candidates according to  characteristics of the 
household and the politician. The main finding is that  post-promotion divorces 
are  concentrated in gender-traditional couples—those with a larger  spousal 
age gap and a more  gender-skewed division of parental leave. Women in 
more  gender-equal  couples do not divorce more often after a promotion. This 
 suggestive evidence highlights the problematic link between couple  formation 
and the glass  ceiling for women in the labor market (see also the discus-
sion in, e.g., Bertrand 2018). Men with high earnings ability are often in rela-
tionships that focus on his career, while women with high earnings ability 
tend to be in  dual-earner  relationships in which she is the primary caregiver 
(e.g., Ely, Stone, and Ammerman 2014 and Kleven, Landais, and Sogaard 2018). 
1 These jobs are in the top 5 percent of the annual Swedish earnings distribution (authors’ calculations; see 
online Appendix Figure W1). They are paid slightly less than representatives in the US Congress and nearly the 
same as California state legislators. Our sample of Swedish CEOs would have their closest equivalent in CEOs of 
midsize American firms.
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For women in traditional marriages, reaching a top job is likely to cause more 
adjustment costs—such as stress and strain from task renegotiation—than for men 
in these traditional unions.
Other explanations for this rise in the probability of divorce for promoted women 
find less support. There is no evidence of a “temptation effect” in which women’s 
(but not men’s) promotions increase the chances of finding a new partner. We do 
not find that women who worked in a more female-dominated previous workplace 
before entering public office are more likely to divorce (McKinnish 2004).2 Divorced 
and promoted women also remarry at a slower rate than divorced women without 
promotions. Another explanation that receives little support is that promotions give 
women (but not men) the necessary economic independence to get a divorce. The 
vast majority of women in our sample have high earnings before their promotion; 
there is only a small positive correlation between the size of the earnings increase 
from the promotion and the probability of divorce. Finally, we find some evidence of 
sensitivity to social norms on the earnings distribution within the couple.
Our paper contributes to the economics, political economics, political science, 
and sociology literatures. In economics, we supplement the growing discussion 
of the causes and consequences of career inequality by gender (e.g., Lazear and 
Rosen 1990; Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz 2010; Bjerk 2008; Booth, Francesconi, 
and Frank 2003; and Smith, Smith, and Verner 2013). Our analysis of promotions 
 complements  previous work on the link between labor market performance and mar-
riage  durability: we improve on the measurement of labor market performance by 
using actual promotions instead of earnings and provide causal estimates.3 Notably, 
by studying promotions to top jobs, our analysis offers a different margin of varia-
tion than previous work focusing on labor market entry, which positions us to better 
understand gender gaps at the top of the income distribution.
For the field of political economics, we offer the first (to our knowledge) 
 analysis of the non-monetary costs of holding political office.4 Evidence of such 
 non-monetary components of the cost-benefit analysis can help improve our 
 understanding of politicians’ career choices (e.g., Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo 
2005 and Mattozzi and Merlo 2008). Our findings suggest that marital stability 
may enter differentially into women’s and men’s cost-benefit analyses when decid-
ing whether to run for political office. Notably, a negative demonstration effect on 
junior women is fully  compatible with a situation where divorce makes promoted 
women better off ( emotionally, financially, or both). As long as a subset of men and 
women who contemplate a career also value a continued relationship, a perceived 
trade-off for women but not for men will create a gender-skewed candidate pool.
2 A female-dominated workplace is defined as an organization, at the plant level, with an above-median share of 
women and, separately, an above-median number of women. 
3 In addition to the work mentioned earlier, see Kesselring and Bremmer (2006) and Newman and Olivetti 
(2018), as well as work on how the negative economic shock of unemployment triggers the risk of divorce when 
the husband, but not the wife, becomes unemployed (Rege, Telle, and Votruba 2007; Charles and Stephens 2004; 
Eliasson 2012; Doiron and Mendolia 2012). 
4 A number of papers study monetary costs, either empirically (e.g., Berg 2018; Eggers and Hainmueller 2009; 
and Fisman, Schulz, and Vig 2014) or theoretically (e.g., Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo 2005 and Mattozzi and 
Merlo 2008). 
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We make a similar contribution to the field of political science. This literature 
has shown descriptively that women politicians are more likely to be divorced 
or single than their male colleagues (e.g., Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013). Our 
paper  provides a causal link between political promotion and marriage duration 
and  suggests that the circumstances of couple formation can be an important 
 factor that shapes gender representation in politics. Finally, our causal analysis 
of job  promotions contributes to sociology research about the drivers of marriage 
 dissolution in general and the role of labor market events in particular (Amato and 
Previti 2003; Oppenheimer 1997; Heckert, Nowak, and Snyder 1998; Jalovaara 
2003; Liu and Vikat 2004; Rogers 2004).
The paper is organized as follows. We start by describing the data and 
 sample  selection for politicians and CEOs. We then describe the pre-promotion 
 characteristics of individuals and households, using both register data and a survey 
conducted by the authors for this study. This is followed by the DID estimation for 
politicians and a descriptive event study for CEO promotions. The final  sections 
investigate  possible mechanisms by splitting the sample based on theoretically 
 relevant  background variables of political job candidates and their households.
I. Data and Sample Selection
We use Swedish register data for the country’s entire working-age popula-
tion, which contains yearly observations from 1979 to 2012. Each person has a 
 mandatory ID code, which is recorded in interactions with numerous public 
 authorities and thus  links individuals to various administrative registers. These 
 registers can be pooled into high-quality datasets with little misreporting and few 
missing observations.
We use the Marriage Register to link spouses to each other and to determine 
whether they divorced. Sweden has no-fault divorce, and couples are not required 
to undergo mediation or a period of living separately. In most cases, divorce 
 proceedings can be processed within one month. The divorce law mandates a 
6-month  cooling-off period between filing for and finalizing a divorce if at least 
one spouse demands it or if the couple has children under 16. About 40 percent of 
the couples in our data have children under 18, meaning that some  non-negligible 
proportion of the divorces in a specific year was initiated in the previous year. The 
couple’s assets are divided equally after a divorce, but apart from child  custody 
payments there is no alimony (maintenance/spousal support) to retroactively 
 compensate spouses for labor  market decisions within the household.
Cohabitation is not perfectly measured in Swedish registers. Joint family ID 
codes are assigned if a couple has a child together or lives together in a  single-family 
home, i.e., not in an apartment. Couples without children or who live in apart-
ments are thus excluded. Our study does not extend to cohabitation for this reason 
and because a large share of individuals in our sample—61 percent of women and 
70 percent of men—were married prior to their promotion.
Our socioeconomic variables are taken from the longitudinal integration  database for 
health insurance and labor market studies (LISA, according to its Swedish acronym). 
This database includes data from tax records on wage income, income from business 
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ownership and parental leave (variable definitions are  discussed further in Section V). 
Between 1979 and 1989, we extract this information from the Income and Taxation 
Register. Additional background variables taken from LISA are sex, birth year, birth 
region, education length, industry code, and occupation code.
We identify CEOs from the occupations listed in the register data (see Andersson 
and Andersson 2009). Politicians are measured in a separate dataset that is linked to 
LISA. All Swedish political parties must report a list of their candidates (including 
their personal ID codes) to the electoral authority in every election. This creates a 
pooled dataset of ID codes for the universe of nominated politicians at all levels 
of politics, which includes their political party, their list rank on the rank-ordered 
 electoral ballot, and whether or not they were elected.
A. Sample Selection: Contenders for Political Promotion
The jobs of parliamentarian and mayor both offer salaries in the top 5 percent 
of the Swedish earnings distribution (online Appendix Figure W1). Being pro-
moted to one of these two jobs results in a similar average increase in earnings of 
about 20 percent (see Berg 2018 for an analysis of parliamentarians; for mayors, 
see Figure 7). Like other top jobs, they also offer a more generous pension plan 
than middle- or lower-level jobs. Work hours are long, and parliamentarians also 
frequently commute to Stockholm from their home district (we return briefly to this 
variation in the robustness checks.
A clear advantage of studying promotions to political jobs is that these positions 
are highly comparable across time and space. In Sweden, the media does not focus 
on politicians’ family situations as they do in some other countries. Politicians’ 
spouses are not involved in political campaigns and are a non-topic in the media. 
There are thus few incentives to stay with one’s spouse for the sake of public 
 appearance. The election campaign season is also quite short, with just one month 
of intensive campaigning.
The main advantage of analyzing political jobs is that we can  identify 
 candidates  who  either won the promotion or sought it but lost. Consider 
 parliamentarians first. In Sweden’s list-based proportional representation system, 
a party’s seats in  parliament are counted from the top of the ballot paper. If three 
seats are won, the top three people on the ballot are allocated to these seats and 
 cannot be removed from office by the party after that fact. Candidate nominations 
are  organized in a geographical quota system with 29 electoral districts. Politicians 
in each district climb their way up through the ballot ranks over time, which is 
 similar to  climbing the career ladder of a private firm. For each ballot in the 29 elec-
toral districts, we define the contenders as the last elected person (i.e., the lowest 
ranked candidate who got elected) and the first unelected person (the highest ranked 
 person who did not get elected). We exclude the extremely small proportion of elec-
toral  ballots (1 percent) from which preference votes determined who was elected 
( further  sample restrictions are described below).5
5 Since 1998, Swedish voters have been able to cast one voluntary preference vote for any candidate on the 
ballot of the party they vote for. There are three reasons that this system does not affect which of the marginal 
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Another important characteristic of Sweden’s parliamentary system is relevant 
for studying promotions to mayor. Each of the country’s 290 municipalities has a 
mayor, who is appointed by the ruling coalition (in the same way that the prime 
minister is appointed at the national level). A ruling coalition typically forms 
within either the right or left bloc of political parties (Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 
1997), giving us two rivals for the position of mayor in each local election: the 
politician at the top of the ballot of the largest party in the left bloc and his or her 
 counterpart from the right bloc. The person whose bloc wins becomes mayor, and 
the  person whose bloc loses usually becomes the opposition leader—a  position with 
 substantially less influence, work hours, and responsibilities. On average over our 
sample period, the average annual earnings of mayors were about  25   percent 
higher than the average for  opposition leaders.6
The mayor is nearly always chosen via the bloc-level electoral contest between 
the top-ranked candidates in the largest parties in the two political blocs. But there 
are three deviations from this rule in the data. First, in 21 percent of the elections, 
political parties outside the traditional blocs won enough votes so that neither of 
the two blocs received a seat majority. Second, in 10 percent of the elections in 
which a bloc did win a seat majority, the largest party did not appoint the mayor. 
In our  sensitivity tests, we show that our results are robust to excluding these 
 elections. The third deviation is that the top-ranked person on the party’s ballot 
fails to become mayor in about 10  percent of the elections.7 This measurement 
error biases our results toward a null effect from promotion, since we count some 
people as  promoted even though they were not.
Parties’ electoral fortunes can shift over time to allow politicians to first win, then 
lose, and then get reelected. To correct the promotion variable for this  possibility, 
we only include persons who have never held either of these two  political jobs 
in the past. We allow losers to appear in the dataset more than once, but clus-
ter the  standard errors at the individual level. A robustness check shows that the 
main result is not sensitive to excluding those who run again after having lost in 
an  earlier  election (see the robustness checks section). Nevertheless, since the 
 split-sample analysis in the mechanism section quickly suffers from small-sam-
ple issues, we keep the repeating  losers throughout to avoid going back and forth 
between  different  estimation samples.8
 candidates is elected and is therefore unimportant for our analysis. First, only one-third of voters utilize their 
 voluntary vote. Second, the vast majority of those who do use their voluntary vote select the top candidates on the 
ballot rather than marginal candidates. Third, the threshold of votes needed to win a seat is prohibitively high (see 
Folke, Persson, and Rickne 2016 for a detailed description).
6 In-depth descriptions of the positions of mayor and opposition leader can be found in Nilsson (2001), Jonsson 
(2003), and Montin (2007).
7 This can be verified in our data, which includes the ID code of all mayoral appointments made after the 2006 
and 2010 elections. 
8 A potential concern with including the repeat losers is that we might get an overrepresentation in the sample of 
people with more stable relationships. This would happen if a person who lost an election becomes more likely to 
reappear in the analysis sample if they did not divorce after the first loss. But bias from this sample selection is likely 
small, since nearly all repeated losers run again in the election immediately following the first loss. As these repeat 
losers are selected for the analysis sample in  t = −4 , which is the previous election year, the selection is done 
before their relationships are (potentially) affected by that election outcome. Our robustness tests also show that the 
estimated treatment effect is larger, not smaller, if we remove the repeated losers (see online Appendix Figure W6).
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We pool the rival candidates for the positions of mayor and  parliamentarian 
in all six elections between 1991 and 2010.9 We then go back in time four years 
before  the  election in which a particular person was a candidate (t = −4). 
In  this  year, we drop politicians who were not married, leaving 70  percent of 
the men and 61   percent of the women (robustness checks show that the results 
are not driven by the choice of starting year).10 We also exclude people who 
reached the age of 65 before the end of the election period (10  percent of the 
sample), a  potential  confounder for divorce if promoted politicians stay longer 
in the  workforce (although the  sample restriction does not affect the estimated 
results). The final sample includes 641 women and 1,246 men. As illustrated in 
Figure 1, we  follow the  relationship  statuses of this  sample over time,  starting four 
years prior to the election in t = −4, up to the election in t = 0, and eight years 
 afterwards to t = 8. We conduct the  analysis on a pooled sample of  promotion 
 winners and  losers  from different  electoral  ballots or municipal  elections 
( following,  e.g., Eggers  and Hainmueller 2009 and Kotakorpi,  Poutvaara, and 
Terviö 2017) because two married women rarely appear as (close) contestants on 
the same ballot or  municipal election.
B. Sample Selection: CEOs
For CEOs, we can only observe people who are promoted, and not those who 
applied but did not get the job. The occupation code that identifies all CEOs 
is  available from 2002 to 2012. We limit the sample to firms with more than 
100   employees to capture top positions in the country’s economic structure. To 
ensure that we capture actual promotions rather than lateral moves, we also limit 
the  sample to internal  promotions to CEO. We go back four years before the 
 promotion and select the  married people (68 percent of the men and 65 percent 
of the women). We also exclude people who turned 65 within four years of their 
 promotion (t = 3). The final sample includes 105 women and 715 men.
9 We exclude the 1994 parliamentary election because of erroneous recording of the list-rank variable for this 
election.
10 Three same-sex partnerships among women politicians were excluded from the sample to facilitate our later 
analysis of heterogeneity between gender-equal and gender-traditional couples. There were no registered same-sex 
partnerships among the men in the estimation sample. 
Figure 1. Timing of Events
Start year
main analysis
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II. Descriptive Statistics
We present two types of descriptive statistics for the sample of politicians and 
place details of the CEO sample in the online Appendix to save space. First, we 
compare the means of socioeconomic variables at both the individual and couple 
levels for men and women who were either promoted or not. These variables are 
measured in the year(s) before the promotion (i.e., pretreatment), and the sample 
is split by gender and by (subsequent) promotion. Selected demographics are also 
compared between the estimation sample and the general Swedish population. A 
second set of descriptive statistics compares the types of promotions that men and 
women receive by plotting the distribution of increases in earnings and reporting 
data from a survey on work hours and influence conducted by the authors for this 
study. The aim is to show that our analysis of divorce is not confounded by men and 
women obtaining promotions to jobs with different characteristics.
We start by comparing the socioeconomic characteristics of job candidates prior 
to the election that assigns the promotion. Relevant variables are derived from 
 previous research on labor market and marriage durability and from sociological 
research on the drivers of divorce (see, e.g., Becker, Landes, and Michael 1977; 
Weiss and Willis 1997; and Amato and Previti 2003). Some of these variables can-
not be affected by the election/campaign work and are therefore measured in the 
election year (t = 0). These individual-level variables include age, age at marriage, 
and a dummy variable for having completed tertiary education. At the household 
level, we measure marriage length, a dummy for whether the marriage is not the pol-
itician’s first, and a dummy for whether both spouses were born in Sweden. Family 
structure is measured using two dummies that measure whether the household has 
children: one indicates at least one child aged 0–17, and the other denotes at least 
one child aged 0–6.
Earnings are measured as the sum of deflated annual earnings from jobs and 
 business ownership. For each person, we take the average of these sums over the 
three years prior to the election (t = −3, t = −2, and t = −1). Using this 
 average rather than a single year provides a more stable measure of earnings, which 
balances out year-to-year variability from temporary labor market absences or from 
events such as temporary unemployment, sickness, or parental leave. We report the 
means of the politician’s earnings, the spouse’s earnings, and a dummy for whether 
the politician’s earnings are higher than the spouse’s earnings.
We compute the division of parental leave based on insurance payments, which is 
available for the full period, and cross-check this information against data for days 
of leave, available from 1993.11 Payments are summed for the three first years of 
each child’s life; if the couple has more than one child, they are averaged across all 
children. We only consider joint children with the current (pre-promotion) spouse.
Table 1 compares the means of the pre-promotion traits within genders and 
between persons who were (subsequently) promoted and those who were not. 
11 Section W1 of the online Appendix shows that these measurements are highly correlated.
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A   simple regression is used to detect statistically significant differences at the 
5  percent level.12
Although the causal claim of the DID design hinges on parallel pre-trends in 
the outcome variable, we can gain useful insights from comparing the levels of 
 observable traits between the treatment and control groups. The comparison shows 
that only a handful of traits are unbalanced, and that the differences are small 
in  absolute terms. One exception is politicians’ earnings, for which we find a 
 pre-promotion difference for both men and women. We return to this variable in the 
DID analysis below, showing that although there is a difference in means, there are 
no differential pre-trends in earnings.
Differences in traits between men and women cannot be omitted variables in the 
main analysis, which assesses men and women separately. But such differences are 
relevant for understanding differences in the size of the treatment effect for women 
and men. The men and women in our sample have a similar average age (roughly 
50), and a similar length of marriage (20 years). Close to 10 percent of both men 
12 We run a regression instead of a t-test so that we can cluster the standard errors at the individual politician 
level. 
Table 1—Comparison of Pre-promotion Traits
Women Men
Subsequently promoted Yes No Yes No
Couple characteristics
Marriage length (years) 20.76 21.01 20.91 20.78
Second marriage (share) 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01
Same birth region (share) 0.89 0.92 0.94 0.93
Has children (0 –17) 0.37 0.36 0.48 0.42
Has children (0 –6) 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.10
Politician’s share of earnings 0.57 0.54 0.68 0.66
Politician out-earns spouse (share) 0.66 0.53 0.90 0.87
Politician’s share of parental leave 0.83 0.81 0.14 0.15
Age difference (politician-spouse) −3.70 −4.01 1.70 1.85
Individual characteristics
Politician’s age 48.60 48.94 49.81 50.89
Politician’s age at marriagea 28.10 28.14 29.02 30.17
Politician’s earningsb 335.4 290.6 370.4 344.3
Politician’s tertiary education (share) 0.65 0.67 0.52 0.53
Spouse’s age 52.60 53.15 48.24 49.08
Spouse’s earnings 282.8 289.8 174.6 179.5
Spouse’s tertiary education (share) 0.42 0.46 0.54 0.52
Observations 235 406 492 749
Notes: Bold letters represent differences between promoted and non-promoted individuals of the same sex at the 
5 percent level or lower, using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with standard errors clustered at the indi-
vidual level.  All measures of earnings are in units of 1,000s SEK (1 SEK ≈ 0.12 USD). 
a  This is a dummy variable that indicates whether the spouses are from different birth regions: Sweden; other 
Nordic countries; EU27, excluding Nordic countries; Asia; Europe, excluding Nordic countries and EU27; 
South America; Africa; North America; Soviet Union; and Oceania.
b  We only know the exact year of marriage for persons who married after 1979. For those married before 1979, 
we define the year of marriage as the year the couple’s first child was born. For couples already married in 
1979 and with no children born before that year, we count 1979 as the year of marriage. This approximation 
was previously used by, e.g., Ginther and Sundström (2010).
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and women have children under 6 years old in the household. There are also traits 
that differ. Men appear to be in relationships that focus on their careers: they are 
older than their spouse, earn more, and do less care work. The women appear to be 
in relationships with a more equal distribution of earnings, but they are generally 
younger and have used more than 80 percent of the couple’s total parental leave. 
This means that even among the women in our sample, who are candidates for top 
jobs, many are in relationships that specialize in the husband’s career (we return to 
these differences in Section VI).
We also compare the women and men in the estimation sample to the  general 
Swedish population in terms of civil status (percent married/divorced) and  family 
structure (percent with any children, percent with at least one non-adult child,  percent 
with at least one small child). The population data are weighted to  correspond to the 
composition of birth cohorts and year of observation for the estimation sample (the 
detailed analysis can be found in online Appendix Section W2 and Table W1).13 
The key takeaway from the description is that men with high-powered careers 
 deviate from the population by having more stable relationships, while women 
with similar careers do not. Women in our estimation sample instead have highly 
similar  family structures to the general population, echoing previous descriptions 
of Swedish  professional women as equally likely as those with less education to 
have children or to ever marry (e.g., Bertrand et al. 2016 and Boschini et al. 2011).
Next, we compare the promotions that men and women receive. Restricting the 
data to promoted people, we compute pre-promotion earnings as the average earn-
ings in the three years prior to the promotion and post-promotion earnings as the 
average of the first three years on the job. Figure 2 plots the differences between 
these two measurements for women and men separately. The two distributions are 
highly similar, showing that women and men receive largely similar distributions of 
pay raises from their job promotions.
Another aspect of promotions is the workload of the new job. For municipal 
politicians, we surveyed mayors to assess their workloads (with a response rate of 
70 percent). The distribution of self-reported weekly work hours is highly  similar 
between female and male mayors (Figure 3). Using data from the 2012 survey of 
Swedish local politicians (KOLFU survey, Karlsson and Gilljam 2014), we can also 
verify that the distributions of male and female mayors’ self-perceived political 
influence are very similar (Figure 4). The description shows that men and women 
have very similar distributions of pay raises from their promotions, and that male 
and female mayors have highly similar distributions of self-reported workloads and 
influence. Differences between genders in these traits of the promotion itself are 
thus unlikely to confound our analyses.
13 We also weigh the population sample to match politicians in terms of their municipality of residence and 
education level, and we do a separate comparison between political candidates and people who hold upper-level 
jobs (as indicated by the occupation code).
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Figure 2. Distribution of Changes in Earnings before and after Promotion (1,000 SEK)
Notes: The figures show the distribution of changes in earnings for promoted men and women. Pre-promotion 
 earnings are measured as the average of annual earnings during the three years prior to the promotion, and 
 post-promotion earnings are averaged across the three years after the promotion.
Figure 3. Self-Reported Work Hours in a Typical Week by Male and Female Mayors
Source: Data from the authors’ survey of mayors in 2013
Figure 4. Comparison of Male and Female Mayors’ Self-Perceived Political Influence
Note: The survey question asked the politician to rate his or her own influence over “policy outcomes at the 
 municipal level.”
Source: Data from the 2012 KOLFU survey (Karlsson and Gilljam 2014) of all municipal politicians (response rate 
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III. Promotion and Divorce among Mayors and Parliamentarians
The main results are shown in Figure 5, with descriptive evidence in the top 
panel  and regression evidence below. The plots show time trends in marriage 
 durability for men and women separately. The lines represent the share of persons 
that remained married to their spouse among persons who are promoted (black lines) 
or not  promoted (gray lines). Both lines start at the value “1” four years before the 
election, reflecting our sample selection of married individuals. Over time, all lines 
slope downward as some marriages end in divorce in each year.
Inspecting the rate of marriage durability in the years leading up to the 
 promotion event in t = 0, we see no differences between men and women who 
are  subsequently promoted (or not). This validates the key identifying assumption 
of our design—the lack of differential trends in divorce rates between the treatment 
and control groups prior to the promotion. In the years after the promotion, the trend 
lines for women start to diverge. Promoted women get divorced at twice the rate 
of non-promoted women, resulting in a 7 percentage point divorce gap three years 
after the election. Looking at the long-term development, we can also see that the 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics, women and men separately
Panel B. Difference-in-difference estimates, women and men combined
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Figure 5. The Effect of Political Promotion on Remaining Married
Notes: Panel A plots the share of job candidates who remain married to the person they were married to in (t = −4) 
in each year. The x-axis shows the year from four years before the election to eight years after the  election. In 
September of election year (t = 0), the persons represented by the black line are promoted to either mayor or par-
liamentarian. Panel B contains the estimates from the DID model (equation (1)), which is run separately for men 
(gray markers) and women (black markers). The markers show the percentage point difference in the probability of 
remaining married between promoted and control groups in each year compared to the baseline event year (t = 0). 
Horizontal lines are 95 percent confidence intervals.
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gap continues to grow, rather than converge, over time. For men, there is no differ-
ence in divorce rates between promoted and non-promoted in either the short or 
long run.
In the bottom half of Figure 5, we report estimations of the difference in marriage 
durability between promoted and non-promoted men and women over time. The 
size of the difference between the treatment and control groups in the probability 
of remaining married in each year is benchmarked against this difference in the 
 election year (t = 0). It is estimated in the following DID model:
(1)  Y i, e, t  =  β t P  i,e ×  T t +  T t +  δ i, e +  S i, e ×  T t +  τ e ×  T t +  ε i,e,t ,
where the dependent variable is a binary indicator for remaining married. The vector ( T t ) is a set of dummy variables for each year before or after an election, starting 
four years before the election (t = −4) and ending eight years afterwards (t = 8). 
The variable  P  i,e takes a value of 1 for those who are promoted and 0 for those 
who are not, which corresponds to the black or gray lines in the top panel of the 
 figure (and thus is constant for the time window around each election). By  excluding 
the time dummy for the year of the election (t = 0), we let this year become the 
 reference category. The estimates on the interactions between each time dummy 
and the promotion dummy ( β t ) thus capture the gap in remaining married between 
 promoted and non-promoted people, relative to the size of that gap in t = 0. By 
examining the estimates for the pre-promotion years, t = −4, t = −3, t = −2, 
and t = −1, we can verify that there is no preexisting difference in the trend in 
divorce rates between subsequently promoted or non-promoted people before the 
promotion. Correspondingly, if the promotion causes a divergence in marriage 
 durability between the promoted and non-promoted, this should show up as positive 
or negative estimates for  β t in the years after the election (t = 1 to t = 8).
The regression specification also includes independent terms for the time 
dummies before or after the election ( T t ) and interactions between these time  dummies 
and (i) fixed effects for each election  τ e and (ii) a binary indicator for  belonging to 
the parliamentary sample,  S i,e . We use these interaction effects to  control for the 
fact that the probability of being promoted, or temporal trends in the  probability of 
being promoted, could differ between elections and between the  parliamentary and 
mayoral samples. Finally, we add fixed effects for each  combination of election and 
individual,  δ i,e   (recall that losing candidates can appear multiple times). The fixed 
effects structure makes it redundant to control for the independent terms of  S i,e ,  τ t , 
and  P  i,e . Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Figure 5 plots the estimates of  β t together with 95 percent confidence intervals. 
The gray points and lines show the estimated promotion effect for men, and the 
black dots and lines show the estimates for women. These estimates show the exact 
same patterns as in the descriptive evidence in the top half of the figure. For both 
men and women, the pre-promotions estimates are close to zero and lack statistical 
significance. After promotions, there is no indication of an effect for men, but a 
sizeable negative effect for women. Three years after the election, promoted women 
are 7  percentage points less likely to remain married than their non-promoted 
counterparts.
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The following sections report the results of our robustness checks. We main-
tain that we have identified a causal effect of promotion on divorce, which is 
 different for men and women in our sample. This does not mean, however, that 
sex per se is the cause of this difference. In other words, although men and women 
are  differentially affected by promotions, we do not expect this gender difference 
to be a consequence of (biological) sex. It might instead be the result of family or 
individual-level  characteristics that differ between the selected sample of male and 
female candidates who have become candidates for top jobs (see Table 1). In the 
mechanism section, we seek more insights into these characteristics using a purely 
descriptive approach.
A. Robustness Test in Close Elections
Despite the parallel time trends in marriage durability before promotion and the 
balance of most pre-promotion traits, a concern about our main analysis could be 
that women—but not men—decide to pursue a promotion when their marriage is 
on the rocks. We address this concern by narrowing the sample of elections to very 
close ones, in which it is highly uncertain which candidate will win. This means that 
the promotion is near-randomly assigned, and that the promoted and non-promoted 
persons should have similar expectations about winning. Selection into candidacy 
based on observed and unobserved characteristics should thus be even less of a 
problem than in the main analysis.
We construct two binary variables that indicate if an election is close, one for 
parliamentary elections and one for municipal elections. For municipalities, the 
indicator captures how similar the two political blocs are in size. A close  election is 
defined as one in which the winning bloc’s win margin, i.e., its share of the total vote, 
is below 5 percent. Calculating the margin of victory for parliamentary  elections is 
a bit more complex. Parliamentary seats are allocated in two rounds, at the district 
and national levels, and the seat allocation is proportional to the national vote share. 
Another complication is that the win margin measured in vote share constitutes 
a closer win margin in a large party than in a small party. We follow Freier and 
Odendahl (2015) and adopt a pure simulation approach to calculate the margin and, 
in turn, set a delimitation value for our binary indicator. A close election is defined 
as a party losing its last (marginal) seat in at least 30 percent of the simulations. 
Online Appendix Section W3 contains a detailed description of how we calculate 
the municipal and parliamentary indicators of close elections. Online Appendix 
Table W2 replicates Table 1, the descriptive statistics for pre-promotion traits, in 
the close election sample. As expected, differences in traits between winning and 
losing candidates are (even) smaller than in the full sample.
Figure 6 replicates the main analysis (Figure 5) for the sample of close 
 elections. The results are very similar to the main analysis, with one exception: the 
 treatment effect is postponed by one year. This is logical, given that the average 
promotion in this sample becomes evident on election night rather than when the 
ballot rank order is set by the party 10 –12 months before. Although the treatment 
effect is  postponed by one year, the size of the estimated effect is still the same at 
the end of the  election period (t = 3). The descriptive evidence suggests that the 
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 promotion doubles a  woman’s probability of getting divorced in the three years after 
the election. But compared to the main analysis, the effect is less precisely estimated 
due to the smaller sample size. The estimate at t = 3 is barely below the 10 percent 
significance level.
B. Robustness Tests for Sample Selection and Pre-trends in Earnings
We run seven additional sensitivity checks: (i) including control variables for 
observables in the baseline estimation; (ii) restricting the sample to those who 
were candidates for top offices for the first time; (iii) using a different starting 
year in the sample selection; (iv) excluding candidates with spouses of retire-
ment age; (v)   estimating the effect separately for mayors and parliamentarians; 
(vi)  excluding data with uncertainty in the electoral allocation of promotions; and 
(vii)  testing for  differential, pre-promotion time trends in the earnings of promoted 
and  non-promoted candidates and their spouses.
First, we re-estimate equation (1) but include control variables for all the 
 predetermined characteristics and traits that were examined in Table 1 (except the 
division of parental leave, which is missing for the 45 percent of the  sample with 
children born before 1980). All controls are included as an interaction with the 
Figure 6. The Effect of Political Promotion on Remaining Married in a Subsample of Close Elections
Notes: The structure of the plot is described in the note under Figure 5. For municipalities, a close election is defined 
as having a win margin less than 5 percent. For parliamentary elections, a pair of list ranks is defined as a close 
election if the party loses the marginal seat in at least 30 percent of the simulations described in online Appendix 
Section W3.2.
Panel A. Descriptive statistics, women and men separately
Panel B. Difference-in-difference estimates, women and men combined
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time dummy variables, and the results replicate the baseline findings (see online 
Appendix Figure W5). The second test is to re-estimate equation (1)  excluding 
 candidates who previously ran for either of the offices but lost. Losing about 
 one-fourth of the sample produces slightly larger standard errors, but the size 
of the point estimates is unaffected (see online Appendix Figure W6). The third 
 robustness check (see Figure W7) shows that the results are unaffected across six 
alternative starting years for the sample selection of married politicians, ranging 
from t = −6 to t = 0, and excluding the starting year used in the main analysis 
(t = −4). The fourth test demonstrates the robustness of the results to excluding 
candidates with spouses who have retired, i.e., reached the age of 65, or will retire 
while the candidate is in office (online Appendix Figure W8).
Next, we split the main sample by the two jobs, mayor or parliamentarian 
(online Appendix Figure W9). The estimated treatment effect is clearly larger for 
 parliamentarians. After three years on the job, the treatment effect is 11  percentage 
points for women parliamentarians and 5  percentage points for women mayors. 
Further probing of this difference shows that it is not due to commuting distance. 
The size of the divorce effect is very similar in districts that are close to, or far 
from, the parliament in Stockholm (results available from the authors).
The sixth test (see online Appendix Figure W10) shows that our results are not 
sensitive to excluding data from elections in which the mayoral party is decided via 
coalitional bargaining, namely when (i) neither of the traditional left or right blocs 
obtains a seat majority, or (ii) the largest party in the winning bloc did not appoint 
the mayor.
A seventh and final robustness check examines the development of  earnings, 
which are separately estimated for politicians and their spouses. The  purpose is 
to test for differential trends in labor market behavior that can indicate  sorting 
of  people with more or less stable marriages into promotion and,  subsequently, 
divorce.  Women with less stable marriages might compete more fiercely to 
get elected and perhaps simultaneously strive harder for a promotion in their 
job  outside  of  politics. This sorting would result in a positive, or possibly 
even a  negative,  pre-trend in the  earnings difference between promoted and 
 non-promoted women. It could also show up as a pretreatment trend in the differ-
ences in earnings between the  politicians’ spouses. If the politician increases his 
or her labor supply, the spouse may also increase their career input if joint leisure 
time is reduced, or reduce their labor input to take on more household responsibil-
ities, or increase it to match the politician’s increased work hours.
We run regression (1) with the outcome variable of the earnings of the politician 
and his or her spouse separately (in real Swedish Kronor, measured in 1,000s). The 
estimates are presented in Figure 7. Negative estimates in the years prior to the 
promotion may be explained by the fact that elections occur in September of the 
election year (t = 0), so the earnings increase for the election winner took effect 
for only four months of that year. In the three years leading up to the election, the 
estimates in the figure show no clear differences in trends in the earnings of the 
promoted women (or men) relative to women (or men) in the control group. This 
indicates that women (or men) who were promoted did not work more, or less, 
intensively in their previous job.
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There are no clear differential pre-trends between the spousal earnings of 
either men or women. The post-promotion estimates also appear void of  spousal 
 adjustments which, to some extent, is a research finding in itself. This finding 
helps us rule out (gender differences in) spousal responses after a promotion, or 
lack thereof, as a major mechanism behind our baseline finding that promotions 
raise the divorce rate among women but not men. It also shows that families do 
not respond to promotions with large shifts in labor market specialization (which 
relates to  previous research by, e.g., Devereux 2004).
Online Appendix Tables W3 and W4 show the results for four alternative  cutoffs 
for close elections. With a more generous cutoff than the baseline, the estimates 
become more precise. With more restrictive cutoffs, the sample size and  precision 
are reduced to the point that the estimated coefficients lose  statistical significance 
at conventional levels. The size of the treatment effect is also reduced, but with 
the large standard errors, we cannot distinguish random noise from a truly smaller 
 treatment effect. We address this problem  maintaining the cutoff for close  elections 
but changing the year that we use to select the sample of  married   politicians. 
Instead of using politicians who are married in t − 4, we use those who are mar-
ried in t = 0. This increases the precision of the  estimate, since about 10 percent 
of the women in the baseline sample divorced before between t = −4 and t = 0, 
 making them immune to the treatment. By selecting  politicians who were married 
in the election year (t = 0), we replace these divorcees with women who got 
 married in the four-year period leading up to the election. This means that the 
treatment effect should increase slightly, since 100 percent of the  sample instead 
of 90 percent can be affected by the  treatment. Changing the sample gives more 
stable estimate sizes across the different  definitions of close elections. The esti-
mated effect three years after the election only loses significance at the 5  percent 
level for the most restrictive definition of close elections (see online Appendix 
Tables W5 and W6).
Figure 7. Pre-trends in Annual Earnings of Politicians and Their Spouses
Notes: The figure shows estimates for running the  promotion regression (equation (1)) on the outcomes of the 
 politician’s earnings (panel A) and the spouse’s  earnings (panel B). The unit on the y-axis is the  relative earnings 
 difference between promoted and  non-promoted individuals in each year and relative to the baseline year (t = 0). 
The unit of measurement is 100 SEK. The sample is restricted to politicians who were married as of four years 
prior to the  election. The gray dots represent the difference relative to  election year between promoted men and 
 non-promoted men, and the black dots provide the corresponding  estimates for women. Vertical lines indicate 
95  percent  confidence intervals.
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IV. Promotion and Divorce among CEOs
The position of CEO is clearly the most prestigious in any firm and is typically 
the pinnacle of a career within that organization. Being the CEO of a firm with more 
than 100 employees is a top job in the private sector. Their average annual earnings 
are well above the ninety-ninth percentile of the distribution of earnings within the 
working-age population of employed persons (authors’ own calculations; see online 
Appendix Figure W1).
As described above, our sample of CEOs consists of men and women who 
all received the promotion, as we have no data on unsuccessful applicants. The 
 pre-promotion descriptive statistics for this sample show strong similarities to 
 political job candidates in terms of the average divisions of paid labor, spousal age 
gap, and division of parental leave (the full set of descriptive statistics can be found 
in Table W2 in the online Appendix).
Panel A of Figure 8 plots the proportions of men and women who remain married 
to their spouse in each year. A shorter post-promotion window, four years, is chosen 
to accommodate the shorter sample period compared to the political jobs. Panel 
B shows the estimated gender difference in the probability of remaining married. 
Female CEOs who were married at the time of their  promotion are more than twice 
as likely to have gotten divorced three years after their  promotion compared to their 
male counterparts. The regression estimates show that the gender difference is sta-
tistically significant at the 5 percent level. Prior to the  promotion, the sample shows 
no clear gender difference in rates of divorce. Although the  descriptive event study 
of CEO promotions does not permit causal inference, the similarity to the political 
promotions analysis suggests that the  baseline finding extends to the private sector.
Extending the analysis to more sectors is difficult because promotions are not 
readily measurable in register data. An attempt to further generalize the findings can 
be found in Section 5 in the online Appendix. We select five  cohorts of university 
graduates in 1989–1993 from four university programs: medical doctors, priests, 
police, and pharmacists. We then go forward in time 20 years and measure each 
Figure 8. Event Study of CEO Promotion and Remaining Married
Notes: Panel A shows the proportions of men (gray line) and women (black line) that remain married to their partner 
in each year, starting four years before the promotion (t = −4) and ending four years afterwards (t = 4). Panel B 
shows the estimated relative probability that the  promoted women will remain married in each year compared to the 
promoted men. The sample (N = 105 women and 715 men) includes all individuals who were  internally promoted 
to CEO in a firm with at least 100 employees between 2003 and 2008. The sample is also restricted to individuals 
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person’s career success relative to their graduating cohort. High career success is 
measured as an income above the cohort median and low success as below this 
amount. Comparing the divorce rate for men and women with high and low career 
success reveals patterns that support the main finding of the paper. In three out of 
four professions (pharmacists are the exception), successful women have higher 
divorce rates than unsuccessful women. For men, the relationship is the opposite: a 
high level of career success is associated with lower divorce rates.
V. Mechanisms
Why does a promotion lead to divorce for women but not for men? In this 
 section, we re-estimate the main analysis in subsamples of data to detect 
common  features of  women who divorce after they are promoted. We begin 
by testing— and  rejecting—a “temptation effect,” in which women’s divorces are 
motivated by exposure to potential new partners. We then describe how divorces are 
more likely in traditional marriages and less common in more gender-equal ones. 
Lastly, we describe a lack of evidence of an “economic independence effect” in 
which women’s divorces are driven by greater economic independence from their 
spouses.
A. The “Temptation Effect”
A promotion can change a person’s work environment and introduce them to 
new  potential partners. If women’s divorces are motivated by exposure to new 
potential partners, they should be concentrated among women who were the least 
exposed to opposite-sex coworkers prior to their promotion (following McKinnish 
2004). We measure the proportion and number of opposite-sex coworkers in the 
 politician’s  previous workplace by leveraging the plant ID code in the register data.14 
We exclude the politicians themselves from this calculation, and to reduce noise, we 
drop  workplaces with fewer than 10 employees (less than 10 percent of the data). 
The sample is then split by the median of the share, or absolute  number, of  colleagues 
of the opposite sex. The two resulting groups have either “low” or “high” expected 
temptation effects. Estimating equation (1) in the two samples does not support the 
temptation effect (see online Appendix Figure W12). If  anything, the  promotion 
effect on divorce is larger for women who enter politics from  relatively male-heavy 
environments.
A more direct test of the temptation effect is to study remarriage rates among 
 promoted and divorced women. Figure 9 provides this description in two steps. 
We first use the pooled sample of winning and losing candidates to compute the 
 proportion of people that divorced within three years after the promotion event 
(black bars). This replicates the main finding that promoted women are more 
14 A workplace is defined by its Cfar code in LISA. This code ensures that we capture colleagues who were 
physically working together since it codifies the plant rather than the firm. Note here that the level of opposite-sex 
coworkers after the promotion is highly similar across all promoted politicians, so we can rely solely on the 
 pre-promotion share for variation. 
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likely to divorce than any other group. We then fast forward eight years after 
the  election and compute the proportion that remarried (gray bars). Comparing 
the black and gray bars for each sex and promotion status gives us the ratio of 
 remarriage to divorce. This shows that 22 percent of the promoted and divorced 
women  remarried, compared to 27 percent of the promoted and divorced men, 
and more than 30   percent for divorcees of either sex who were not promoted. 
This result— that  promoted and divorced women are less likely than  others 
to  remarry—offers additional evidence against the temptation effect as an 
 explanation for the higher divorce rate of promoted women.
B. Traditional and Gender-Equal Marriages
Economic theory suggests that marriages may be destabilized if job promotions 
move the division of paid (or unpaid) labor away from the spouses’ expectations 
of those divisions (e.g., Becker, Landes, and Michael 1977 and Weiss and Willis 
1997). These expectations are formed early in the relationship, at the time of the 
“match.” If a husband is promoted in a gender-traditional couple that has special-
ized around his career since its early stages, this conforms with expectations. If, 
however, the wife is promoted in a gender-traditional couple, this deviates from the 
 expectation. In the context of our study, we expect women’s divorces to be concen-
trated in  traditional marriages rather than more gender-equal marriages.15
15 A similar prediction can be drawn from sociology. A promotion may be seen as a critical transition point in 
a person’s career. Such events can lower marital satisfaction by creating stress and conflict around the (expected) 
Figure 9. Promotion, Divorce, and Remarriage
Notes: The black bars show the proportion of men and women that divorced three years after the  promotion by pro-
motion status. The gray bars show the  proportion that remarried at eight years after the promotion. The numbers 
below each set of bars show the ratio of remarriage to divorce for each  combination of sex and promotion status.
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Economic theory is agnostic on which spouse would initiate the divorce when 
a promotion causes a change in the expected division of paid and/or unpaid labor. 
As the labor market outcomes of one spouse deviate more from the expected path, 
the cost-benefit calculus of remaining married shifts for both spouses (e.g., Becker, 
Landes, and Michael 1977 and Weiss and Willis 1997). It is useful to think of this 
 transition in terms of adjustment costs. When couples face greater adjustments to 
the division of their economic and social roles, stress and friction can affect both 
people and reduce the utility from a continued relationship.
We use two variables to capture gender-traditional marriages. The first is the  spousal 
age gap, an indicator of gender-based specialization within the  couple (Becker 1981, 
Eagly 1987).16 The second is the division of parental leave, described in Section III. 
Like the spousal age gap, the split of parental leave  measures  gender-based spe-
cialization in the early phases of a relationship. This variable  captures large time 
investments, since the Swedish leave policy covers 480 days of paid leave per child, 
and the vast majority of couples utilize the policy for at least 12 months (Statistics 
Sweden 2016).17 For the people in our sample, parental leave and couple formation 
happened decades ago since their average age is 50 and the average marriage length 
is 20 years (recall Table 1).
Figure 10 shows the distributions of the spousal age gap and the parental leave 
split. Although they are candidates for jobs that fall in the top 5  percent of the 
 earnings distribution, the women’s relationships show clear signs of prioritizing the 
husband’s career. Four out of five women in the sample are married to an older man 
and utilized more than 80 percent of the family’s total parental leave themselves. 
Among the male politicians, we see a similar pattern of gender-based specialization. 
Two-thirds are married to a younger woman, and fewer than one in five utilized 
more than 20 percent of the couple’s total parental leave.18
We divide the sample into three groups based on the spousal age gap: (i) the pol-
itician is younger by four years or more, (ii) the age gap is relatively small (three 
years or less),19 and (iii) the politician is older by four or more years. For the split 
of parental leave, we are forced to take a liberal view about what constitutes a more 
or less traditional marriage. A gender-traditional marriage is defined as a couple 
in which she took more than 90 percent of the leave, and remaining marriages are 
considered gender-equal.
The results in Figures 11 and 12 show that divorce among promoted women is 
concentrated in couples that were more specialized around the husband’s career 
roles of the husband and wife (e.g., Coverman 1989). In our context, such conflicts could be expected to be the 
greatest for couples that started out with a more gender-traditional division of roles, but the wife is later promoted 
to a top job. 
16 Using the terminology of social exchange theory, a couple in which the husband is older than the wife is orga-
nized to benefit from social exchanges that transfer economic resources from the husband to the wife and resources 
such as sex and children from the wife to the husband (following Thibaut and Kelley 1959).
17 The first 390 days have a wage-replacement rate of 80 percent and the remaining 180 days a fixed payment 
rate of 20 euros. People whose earnings do not qualify them for the wage-replacement part of the benefits receive 
the fixed payment throughout. 
18 These variables are not simply picking up the age of the politician. For women, the correlation between age 
and the spousal age gap is 0.08, and the correlation between age and the politician’s share of parental leave is −0.04. 
For men, the corresponding correlations are 0.15 and 0.02. 
19 The empirical findings remain the same if we change the cutoff points by one year in either direction.
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Figure 10. Distributions of the Spousal Age Gap and the Politician’s Share of Parental Leave
Notes: The top graphs show the distribution of the spousal age gap, measured as the politician’s age minus the 
spouse’s age. The bottom graphs show the politicians’ share of the total days of parental leave utilized by the  couple 





































0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1











0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1














Panel C. Politician four years older or more


















−4 −3 −2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8−1
−4 −3 −2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8−1
−4 −3 −2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8−1
Women, N = 303
Men, N = 75
Women, N = 318
Men, N = 819
Women, N = 22
Men, N = 354
Figure 11. The Effect of Political Promotion on Remaining Married in Subsamples Based on the Spousal 
Age Gap
Notes: The spousal age gap is measured as the politician’s age minus the spouse’s age. The figure shows DID 
 estimates from equation (1) for three subsamples based on this variable. Results for women politicians who are at 
least four years older than their husband have been excluded due to the small sample size.
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in the early stages of the relationship. Divorce is more likely to occur when the 
promoted woman (i) is younger by her spouse by a larger margin and (ii) took a 
relatively larger share of the parental leave. Strikingly, we find no divorce effect in 
the subsample of women in more gender-equal couples. When the couple is closer 
in age and when the husband took relatively more parental leave, there is no increase 
in the divorce rate after the woman’s promotion. Comparing Figures 11 and 12, the 
precision is smaller when we split the sample based on the parental leave division, 
but the pattern is similar to that for the spousal age gap: there is a larger divorce effect 
in gender-traditional couples. Recall also that the sample size is smaller for this vari-
able due to the unavailability of parental leave data for children born before 1980.
C. Economic Independence and Other Explanations
A promotion may give women economic independence from their spouse and 
enable them to get a divorce (e.g., Oppenheimer 1997). Potential support for this 
mechanism comes from research showing that marriages are more sensitive to 
women’s than to men’s economic outcomes (Heckert, Nowak, and Snyder 1998; 
Jalovaara 2003; Liu and Vikat 2004; Kesselring and Bremmer 2006; but c.f. Rogers 
2004).
We subdivide the sample by whether the increase in earnings from the  promotion 
was larger or smaller than the median among promoted politicians of the same 
sex. We also do two sample splits to examine the relative earnings increase: being 
above the median for the change in earnings in proportion to the politician’s 
own ( pre-promotion) earnings, and being above the median for the change in the 
 politician’s own earnings as a proportion of total household earnings before the 
promotion.
The results, presented in online Appendix Figure W13, suggest that economic 
independence is not a key mechanism for women’s increased divorce risk. The esti-
mates for the two groups of earnings increases, above and below the median, are 
Figure 12. The Effect of Political Promotion on Remaining Married in Subsamples Based on the Wife’s 
Share of Total Parental Leave
Notes: The figure shows DID estimates from equation (1) for two subsamples based on the wife’s share of the total 
days of parental leave utilized by the couple. This variable is described in detail in Section III.
Panel A. Wife took at least 90% of parental leave
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similar in size and not statistically different from each other, for either absolute or 
relative earnings. The lack of evidence of an economic independence effect is not 
surprising given the level of pre-promotion earnings of the women in our sample. 
Most of them already had high earnings before the promotion, and many also out-
earn their spouse (recall Table 1).
Some additional heterogeneity analysis can be found in the online Appendix 
(Section W6). In sum, we find some evidence that a promotion that makes the 
wife the dominant earner in the household (>60 percent) is more strongly related 
to divorce than a promotion that drives her earnings above 50 percent. We do not 
find that divorces are concentrated in dual-earner couples, which would perhaps be 
expected from a mechanism whereby a promotion crowds out joint leisure time. 
Looking specifically at the portion of households with children under 18, we fail 
to detect any strong concentration of divorces to these households (the fraction of 
households with even younger children is too small for a meaningful analysis). 
Finally, splitting the sample by the median age at marriage rejects the role of limited 
information in spousal choice as a potential mechanism. If anything, the divorce 
effect is larger for women who marry at an older age and where information is 
expected to be better.
The results in this section point to the importance of a mismatch 
between  expectations  about spousal behavior—in the early phases of the 
 relationship— and  actual labor market outcomes as an explanation of women’s 
divorces after promotion. Women in gender-traditional couples have a higher rate 
of divorce after being promoted to a top job, while women in more gender-equal 
couples do not. It appears that couples face adjustment costs when the spouse whose 
career was initially subordinate is promoted. Interestingly, the upper left graph 
(panel A) in Figure 11 suggests that men who are married to an older woman also 
face an increased probability of divorce after promotion (although these relation-
ships remain unusual and standard errors are large). This indicates that deviations 
from expected economic roles, regardless of gender, can lead to divorce. Our base-
line finding of women’s increased divorce rate after promotion could therefore stem 
from the fact that women more often find themselves in relationships that initially 
focus on the career of the other person, while men do not.
A related interpretation of the findings in this section is that promoted women 
divorce men who are less supportive of their careers. Some additional descriptive 
statistics support this interpretation, while others do not. In support, promoted 
and divorced women are slightly more likely to be reelected to office than pro-
moted and  divorced men. However, we find no correlation between divorce and 
 characteristics of the husband that could proxy for a lower marriage utility for 
the wife.20
20 We tested the husbands’ level of earnings prior to the promotion, the husband’s education level, and the 
 husband’s cognitive and noncognitive skills measured in Sweden’s military draft (results available from the 
authors). Unfortunately, there are too few remarriages among promoted and divorced women and their spouses for 
us to examine “updated” spousal choices.
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VI. Conclusions
We study the consequences for men’s and women’s relationships of being 
 promoted to top jobs. The main result is that promotions destabilize women’s 
 marriages but not men’s. This finding can help explain the persistently small 
 proportion of women in top jobs. In our data, married women and men who obtained 
top jobs had both been married for 20 years, on average—quite a significant time 
investment. At the time of their promotion, women were substantially more likely 
to lose their spousal support system than men. Giving up on the relationship may 
very well be the  woman’s choice and may be a positive outcome for her. But the 
results still highlight a large gender inequality in access to the first-best option for 
most: a functioning relationship and a successful career.21 It is reasonable to expect 
that the candidate pool for top jobs would be skewed by a condition for women, 
but not for men, to put their relationship at risk.
Our descriptive analysis of the common features of women who divorce 
 indicated  a  link between couple formation and the destabilizing role of 
 promotions  to  top jobs. Couples that formed in a more gender-egalitarian 
 manner  did  not  experience an increased divorce rate after promotion. The 
divorces were instead concentrated among women in couples that focused on the 
husband’s  career in the early stages of the relationship. This result indicates a 
link between the marriage market and the labor market. As long as the marri-
age  market produces mainly couples that specialize in the man’s career, this pat-
tern of  couple  formation may hinder gender equality in top jobs. Prioritization 
of the  husband’s career remains common around the world, even in progressive 
countries like Sweden (Boschini et al. 2011) and even for women at the top 
of the ability distribution. As long as there is little specialization in the oppo-
site  direction— households in which the wife is the dominant earner and the 
husband takes primary responsibility for   childcare— the  average woman will 
face greater stress in her family life when trying to obtain a very demanding 
top job.
These findings lead us to tentatively conclude that gender equality in top jobs 
should be further examined from the viewpoint of couple formation. More  similar 
distributions of the economic roles in relationships could be a potential remedy for 
the persistent gender divide in career performance and earnings (e.g., Goldin 2014 
and Esping-Andersen 2016). Future research could explore the conditions that allow 
women at the top of the ability distribution to expand their choice set of  partners to 
“marry down,” and for men to do the opposite.
Arguably, the Swedish welfare state and gender-egalitarian norms should 
 provide  an ideal environment for equal career opportunities. Household labor 
is more  equally divided in Sweden than in most other countries, and afford-
able  universal  child and elder care relieves career-oriented families of substan-
tial demands on their time. If the family is a source of tension for career women 
in this context, it might  present even greater challenges in places with less 
21 In Sweden, more than 98 percent of women and men in the 2010 World Values Survey reported that “family” 
is “important” or “very important” in their lives.
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 generous  policy conditions or social norms. However, a less permissive context 
could  prohibit   professional women from getting married in the first place (e.g., 
Bertrand et al. 2016). More research is needed to explore the joint developments 
of marriage and labor market across contexts and over time.
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